Tag Archive for capitalism

Could Uber be Collectivised?


A provocative piece in The Nation suggests turning the so-called “ride-sharing” company known as Uber into a worker-owned enterprise. In “Socialize Uber: it’s easier than you think, Mike Konczal and Bryce Covert argue that since Uber owns only the proprietary technology that coordinates the glorified taxi rides and processes payments, and drivers own their own cars, Uber is an excellent candidate for conversion to a worker cooperative.

Collectivisation of Uber is a tempting notion, but the authors’ conclusion that it’s the “obvious transition” for Uber is hard to fathom. First, they curiously fail to note that it would be virtually impossible (in a legal and technical sense) for the drivers to acquire Uber. The company is privately owned, with equity held between the founders, many employees, and a huge array of venture capitalists, individual investors, and other firms. These shareholders have complete legal prerogative to hold their equity until the company goes public or sells off (and beyond). The only way the workers could buy Uber is if they pooled their money and acquired the company, which would cost way more than its current $40 billion valuation. Indeed, due to the special circumstances of needing to acquire every last share and option from current holders, this would constitute, by a factor, the most expensive acquisition in the history of venture capitalism.

But let’s just play make-believe and look at Uber as if the workers could assume the reins overnight. I believe in worker cooperatives, not just as an organizational model for firms, but as a transformational force for our economy. That said, Uber is not merely a bunch of hard-working drivers coordinated by technocratic drones. If Uber establishes itself as a dominant, static force in the taxi economy, it might eventually become nine parts technocracy for every one part human ingenuity. But for now, it’s a new kind of craft in very uncertain conditions; autopilot is not an option.

The authors note, “It takes an entrepreneur to start up ride-sharing, but not to run it as a firm.” In truth, it takes a handful of entrepreneurs as well as venture capital to bring a startup of this kind to scale, and it takes a team with exceptional business sense to see it through the growth stage. Even as a staunch advocate of collectivism, I am willing to concede that successfully introducing a disruptive product into a market of this kind is beyond the reach of collectives or self-funded worker-run enterprises. At the very least, they would have to seek investment capital and empower managers with extraordinary vision to navigate this crucial phase. These are two very problematic necessities.

We all know what happens when workers empower managers to use their exceptional talent—those managers demand exceptional compensation. I’m not saying capable people don’t exist who would do this for humble wages, but they’d be exceedingly hard to find. Anyone with a proven track record has far more lucrative options. So whom would workers hire or promote to steer the company? This is where CEOs and other executives command what appear to be rentier compensation packages. It isn’t the actual scarcity of talent, but the scarcity of pedigree, that they’re leveraging. Even the ones with relatively poor records exercise the terrific advantage of having a resumé that shows they know anything at all about running a big company. While it’s surely far easier than they would have us believe, it’s not perfectly intuitive; not just anybody can pick it up overnight. Leadership isn’t an insurmountable obstacle, but it highlights a major problem and a significant gamble.

And then there’s the capital. Even if they don’t need $100B in up-front cash, Uber would need regular influxes of investment capital in order to grow while competing with other venture-backed companies in the ride-hailing app market (not to mention the main competition: taxis). We’re talking no less than tens of millions of dollars on a semi-regular basis. It’s difficult for worker cooperatives in conventional industries to get loans or other traditional forms of cash infusions; this is basically impossible for venture startups in unproven markets.

You might say, why not reinvest profits as capital for growth? Besides the fact that worker-owners would have to consistently forego dividends to grow the firm (a conventional co-op dilemma) the biggest reason is really that it puts tremendous pressure on creating big margins in the first place. Competitors will meanwhile enjoy the relative breathing room of not having to scrape every ounce of profit out of their model while growing strategically. Some of these companies pay no attention to profits at all as they spend investor money improving their position in the market.

This is why venture capital exists—to take seemingly insane risks seeking commensurate returns on the rare wins. For startups, they provide the ability to grow without cannibalizing revenues. I cannot imagine a VC firm wanting to invest in a labor-managed startup, and it wouldn’t be a cooperative if such a firm did decide to invest.

But why wouldn’t an investor want to back a democratically managed startup? We know a lot of these new Silicon Valley firms are relatively flat. Here we get to Konczal and Covert’s claim that at its core, Uber is just a technocracy:

And these workers [drivers] labor individually, doing the same tasks, so there’s no need for a management class to control their daily operations. The capital owners maintain the phone app, but app technology isn’t the major cost, and it’s getting cheaper and easier by the day.

Developing successful technology isn’t just writing code, and most of the supposedly “flat” tech startups are neither nonhierarchical nor equalized in pay scales. Even if the code and the coders came with the acquisition (which they would), consider that all these years a relative handful of people at Uber have been figuring out what to make all that code do. There’s institutional knowledge and specialized skills behind that, some of which might be maintained beyond collectivisation, though that’s doubtful (why would a CTO or senior engineer or product manager stick around—why even would a junior developer who can start anywhere at $75,000 plus equity?). Could the right workers collectively do this under the right circumstances? I believe so. But not coders who weren’t hired for these propensities, and definitely not overnight.

Okay, so forget Uber (seriously, Uber is awful). What if all the Uber drivers wanted to set up their own competing co-operative? Maybe even do something innovative and offer regular customers shares in the company! Unfortunately, the above problems would persist.

There’s that pesky problem of the technology and infrastructure. The overhead costs for such a venture are not trivial, but replicating the model is conceivable. Uber’s trade secrets would be pretty hard to obtain, protected as they are by nondisclosure agreements that could keep even sympathetic insiders from aiding the dissident worker-owned venture. Still, I think most of the model is in plain view. So they’d have to get the right developers working for the right reasons. It’s theoretically possible, but I’d rank it as highly difficult.

It remains harder still to figure out where the capital would come from, and how the organization would work such that drivers, technologists, and business development workers would be on the same page at equitable wages and equal stakes of ownership and control. The irony, of course, is that this company would be competing with Uber and all its infrastructure and those piles of venture capital. My conclusion is precisely the opposite of Konczal and Covert’s: Uber is among the worst candidates for the cooperative model on a large scale.

Now, all this being said, if someone were to create open-source software for the ride-hailing industry, I bet small collectives of highly motivated driver-owners could perhaps eek out nice livings in the right markets. I would love to see that, and in fact I’d lend my expertise to such a project. But this sadly isn’t the place we’re going to kick capitalism’s ass.


‘Market Leninism’ is Kinda Just Fascism


Political commentator and Daily Beast managing editor John Avlon has been throwing around a label for the emerging political economies of Russia and China that I think was introduced by Nicholas Kristoff in the New York Times two decades ago. Avlon explains in a Daily Beast commentary that was picked up by several other outlets:

Russia and China, along with some of their old satellite states, have traded Marx and Lenin for Market Leninism. The militaristic one-party state endures with varying degrees of electoral kabuki, but the nomenklatura now attracts global capital, swilling champagne in jet set nightclubs instead of behind dacha walls.

This twist on “Marxism-Leninism” may sound slightly catchy, but if you think about it, they’re basically just becoming fascist economies, and there’s really no need to invent a new term – certainly not one so ridiculous as “Market-Leninism”. The neo-nomenklatura, or the new propertied ruling class, of Russia and China are the freshly christened millionaires and billionaires who parallel the domestic industrialists of fascist European nations in the 1930s. Those outside the Party’s core don’t directly wield tremendous political power, but if they play by the rules, they thrive on the kind of institutionalized corruption and cronyism that marked Italian, German, and Spanish experiments with fascism.

This critique isn’t meant to start a semantics debate; I really just want to take the opportunity to highlight the structural similarities between the post-Communist economies like Russia’s, China’s, and Vietnam’s, with the European fascism of the mid-Twentieth Century. It’s worth noting, due to the frightening prospects for this model influencing contemporary American political economy, which may be far more likely than you’d guess.

We currently define economies with broad strokes based on dominant attributes.* The US is characterized by private ownership of most industry, as well as by market determinants of material and wealth coordination; we call this market capitalism, even though the markets aren’t pure and there are lots of publicly owned enterprises. In the Soviet Union, industrial ownership was nationalized and central planning was the chief method for deciding who made and consumed how much of what goods and services – command socialism.

In fascist countries like Germany and Italy, the model was private ownership of most industry, markets determining most prices, but the state intervening heavily through command to enforce nationalistic priorities and to ensure stability. Basically, Hitler and Mussolini reserved the prerogative to override any market signal with a new directive.

This is a power still out of executive and even governmental reach in modern Western Europe and North America but exercised with regularity in China and Russia today. When contemporary Western governments want to broadly influence industry, they tend to do it through the blunt instrument of legislative policymaking that encourages or discourages certain economic activity for national priorities. Executives can’t command very much in the economic sphere.

The transformation of the past quarter century, in both Russia and China, has involved much greater market influence internally, to be sure. But also a massive privatization of industries, and there’s nothing Leninist about privatization. Avlon even alludes to this being the major variation between the Cold War and now, citing the fact that “the nomenklatura now attracts global capital” in his paragraph defining “Market Leninism”.

Of course, to be clear, that’s not the part that upsets John Avlon or Nick Kristoff. To Western neoliberals, privatization of the means of production is a natural step. They are just upset about the nationalistic tendencies that manifest as the one-party state overriding market forces. Avlon is complaining about the heavy-handed, iron-fisted, one-party domination of these countries’ economies and the refusal of individual civil liberties. That’s where the (quite legitimate) charge of lingering “Leninism” comes from.

Yet if you’re going to mix private ownership with overwhelming government interference in the coordination aspect, aren’t you really talking about fascism? Fascist economics is all about maintaining a small, wealthy capitalist class while enforcing strict adherence to nationalistic principles and service to the state, with the government intervening to both stabilize and reprioritize economic activity.

Writing of then-Chinese ruler Deng Xiaoping, Kristoff noted in 1993 that China’s leadership was post-Marxism-Leninism, with a privatization spree already underway. Deng and his circle had eschewed Marx’s rejection of markets yet retained “a fondness for Leninism, in the sense of highly disciplined one-party rule with centralized decision-making”. Kristoff added, “Their aim, in other words, is Market-Leninism.”

Mussolini, Franco, and Hitler all had similar takes on Marx and Lenin. They were vehemently opposed to using central planning to orchestrate socioeconomic equality, preferring distinctive class divisions as virtuous. So they figured, why not let capitalist markets do the default economic coordination, since as Marx himself had rightly argued, markets and the pursuit of profit will tend to exacerbate those class divisions? But the fascists concluded they should indeed use a strong, unopposed nationalist party and cadre to enforce essential central planning in favor of state power whenever necessary. This was one of Lenin’s highly miscalculated (and vile) contributions to the actual implementation of the Marxian project; it’s what Hitler, Mao, Lenin, and Mussolini all had in common vis-a-vis economics.

The transformations in China and Russia have been very much in this direction and sound exceedingly fascistic. In each:

  1. the means of production are increasingly owned primarily by an elite wealthy class or nationalized to enable graft;
  2. controlled by fiat or regulated in such a way as to sustain rent-seeking among capitalist cronies;
  3. otherwise with market forces doing the basic price-setting and coordinating; and
  4. a state that offers boisterous rhetorical support for the “working class” but deprioritizes worker’s rights and effectively outlaws autonomous organization of labor.

In the case of Russia, in fact, you’d be pretty hard-pressed to draw many significant structural differences between its political economy and those of mid-20th Century fascist states. China maintains more nationalized industries, but this too is changing through a form of liberalization that so far affects capitalist property rights far more than individual political rights.

Avlon’s concern seems to be that economic liberalization has not led to democracy in the formerly communist states, which on one hand undermines hypotheses that capitalism is inherently democratizing, but on the other hand suggests they’re just not doing capitalism right.

What’s worse, some [American] CEOs privately grouse that they would rather invest their capitol [sic] in one-party states, not only because of the potential rate of return, but also because they feel America’s political system is increasingly inefficient and chaotic when it comes to making long-term decisions.

I’m far more concerned that China (more so than Russia, for sure) will demonstrate a more durable version of capitalism during periods of economic tribulation than the relatively laissez faire nations of the world generally have. As crises driven by resource depletion and climate change generate more and more national emergencies, Americans will hopefully begin to realize what a danger markets pose and how weak the various preferred methods of regulating or manipulating them through political means. And you can bet your bald spot China will be responding more assertively and often more effectively to similar challenges on its land and shores.

Avlon continues, about the claims of inefficiency in the capitalism-democracy mix:

We’ve heard these claims before. In the 1930s, the buzz was that liberal capitalist democracy was decadent and declining – that the pluralism and diversity of the USA was our greatest weakness because we could not reason together. … The mirror-image systems of communism and fascism promised to solve problems quickly through command and control.

This is of course true in the long run, and Avlon is right that democratically influenced Western capitalism proved more resilient in peacetime than the even-more-vicious manifestations such as the Soviet and Nazi systems. But what about a softer form of command-and-control capitalism? The new fascism has features that are attractive to capitalists unconcerned about the personal liberties of industrial workers and the poor. And make no mistake, this system is more likely to appeal to liberals than to conservatives.

Note as well, any Western capitalist eyeing the Chinese system with envy is not lusting over any remnant unique to Marxism. He’s not licking his lips over the use of central planning to flatten classes. His nascent drool has nothing to do with high rates of public ownership of industry. He’s looking at private ownership and a government-manipulated market, currency, etc.

Fascist economics is, after all, a form of capitalism. It’s only a couple of steps removed from the American-style cocktail. Classic fascism embraced all of the main elements of the American political economy except (1) fondness for international trade and (2) our less-bilateral influence between industry and polity. Whereas the fascist government reserved the right to control industry (the erstwhile funders of the ruling party) in service to the state, the Western “democracy” observes a largely hands-off policy, behaving more like a puppet on behalf of its funders, with only the pretense of respect for a so-called “national interest” and intervention to avert only the most egregious market failures.

Other characteristics of fascism include fomentation of class antagonism and elimination of effective political opposition. Class antagonism has not reached fascistic levels in the United States by any means, mostly because the working class has not played an active role in the conflict as it did in 1920s Europe. (However, we certainly have the fascist work ethic down!)

With regard to political opposition, as Avlon notes, instead of a command-ready one-party state, US national politics is hobbled by petty divides separating the two branches of the capitalist party (that last bit is my interpretation, not Avlon’s). He obviously yearns for a vibrant two-party dynamic that can compromise decisively, but in truth all of these options are just various ways a polity can relate to its financial backbone. With such a demonstrably slim difference between fascism and capitalism, it’s not clear why the Avlons and the Kristoffs spend so much of their time focused on the shortcomings of the Chinas and the Russias instead of analyzing the corporatist structure of the US political economy.


*There are two main determinants of the broad character of an economy. These are (1) ownership of the means of production and (2) form of coordination. To keep it simple, the ownership options are basically: collective (state or public ownership) or private (individual or shareholder ownership). On the matter of how much of what goods and services are produced and consumed by whom, the options are basically planning (command) or markets (supply/demand). The dominant options tend to determine the form of economy: market capitalist, planned socialism, market socialism, or planned capitalism (fascism).

Chinese propaganda poster from chineseposters.net.


Left Catastrophism and Its Detractors

The Coming Economic Collapse That Never Was

The perfect subject for my return to this blog has presented itself in the form of an interview with Sasha Lilley, following up on the 2012 book Catastrophism: The Apocalyptic Politics of Collapse and Rebirth, which Lilley contributed to.

It has been a long time since I’ve nodded my head throughout an article while fundamentally disagreeing with a key part of its basic thesis. But that was my response to “Hoping for the Worst“, an interview with Lilley by Samuel Grove about just why so many people who want to make a better world seem to yearn for economic catastrophe and collapse, as if it will necessarily hasten the change they seek. With wisdom and clarity, Lilley thrashes what is indeed a commonplace view, which she calls Left catastrophism, used by many progressives and radicals as an excuse to wait for change to arrive, rather than making it themselves.

I found myself agreeing strongly with Lilley while also, uncomfortably, recognizing some of my own beliefs among those she is roundly criticizing. But Lilley’s representation of the archetypal collapse-anticipating radical doesn’t fit me or many others I know. I absolutely, unequivocally do not hope that global catastrophe arrives in order to usher in a new post-capitalist era.

In the first place, like Lilley, I don’t think such a meta-crisis would necessarily yield an egalitarian future. In fact, we suspect quite the opposite would emerge. In times of crisis, Lilley notes, humans do tend to turn toward regressive rather than progressive solutions:

Fear … tends to tilt right, not left. When people are fearful, they’re more likely to accept authoritarian solutions and the scapegoating of immigrants and others.

Ever skeptical of utopic pretenses, I simply do not believe that from the chaos of mass social upheaval will naturally emerge a peaceful, orderly anarchy. Such a thing must be strategized and painstakingly organized through struggle, and then failed at many times before success is at hand.

Even short of reactionary responses to crises, great upheavals are more likely to necessitate centrally coordinated solutions. In the wake of a real collapse scenario — the likes of which pretty much nobody involved in this debate can remotely fathom — the more reasonable among lifelong anarchists may just earnestly support authoritarian solutions. You might think you’ll simply twinkle and consense your way to socialism if the government and its systems suddenly vanished, but I wouldn’t bet on it.

Lilley describes the probable result of “disaster fatigue” and the patronizing nature of the notion that more bad outcomes from capitalism will raise consciousness. She notes:

[People] don’t need convincing that something is wrong, or that the system we live under doesn’t work for them.

Unfortunately, Lilley seems to hold out hope in the potential for revolutionary change without war or any other calamity, if only for the sake of having hope. She is cynical about cynicism:

Political despair and a crisis of organization lend themselves to the hope that an external jolt will replace the arduous work of reaching out to and organizing others. … Catastrophism is, amongst other things, about shortcuts and the messy business of fighting and losing sometimes and winning others can be shunted to the side.

Lilley even sympathizes with some catastrophists — those who are desperate for a better world but fear that jolt will be required:

Add to this the very real urgency that many people feel about the need to stop the ravages of capitalism—global warming being the most obvious—and catastrophism is eminently understandable.

I think perhaps this is what discerns a reasonable belief that socioeconomic collapse is highly probable, from catastrophism — the hope that it will happen soon, ushering an era of great positive changes.

Lilley seems to hold as near certainty that capitalism will adapt to oncoming crises, rather than undo itself through internal contradictions or ever allow itself to be undone by outside forces such as climate change or resource depletion.

Denial is the first stage of... No it isn't!

But I see a bit of paradox in Lilley’s assertions:

  1. Capital will not permit itself to wither or collapse from external causes…
  2. …yet, workers could organize to defeat capital…
  3. …and if capitalism were to crumble due to outside factors, the same workers (who are powerful enough to overthrow it now) would then be unable to establish a superior alternative order.

I’m definitely convinced of Point 3, excepting the parenthetical flourish added to emphasize the contradiction, but the other two are not so obvious to me.

This is subjective stuff, to be sure, but my twenty years of closely observing the US Left in action have left me with essentially no confidence that it can or will evolve into a force that could organize a revolution against capitalism.

While I’m perhaps less impressed by the Left and its potential, I also see more weaknesses in late capitalism than Lilley seems to discern. I’m surrounded by optimists who believe capitalism will innovate its way out of climate change and find ways around the very real matter of finite resources. I am far less convinced that the End Game is not close at hand.

Despite my skepticism, pessimism, and cynicism, I believe in working toward practical solutions. I advocate dual power strategy — radical organizing that also happens to be relatively collapse-resistant. It’s an actual plan for dealing with economic catastrophe or smaller-scale chronic crises without necessitating, investing in, or hoping for such events.

I also agree with Lilley that there will be no radical social change without struggle. Collapse, catastrophe, or blue skies, any transformation will be made by people, through organization.

But I find hope for hope’s sake overrated. I spent years mimicking Noam Chomsky’s adaptation of Pascal’s Wager: we don’t know we can bring about real, lasting social change, but we know if we do not try, we are certain to fail.

Okay, well, what does the evidence suggest? After years of believing — insisting even — that a pro-active revolution leading to a dramatically altered world was possible and attainable, I have reached the sad realization that the people of this current world are not going to make that happen, possible or not. Despite my intense desire to conclude otherwise, I see no real evidence that authentic revolution is in the cards.

Lilley’s final statement in the interview is, to me, most revealing of the weakness of all sides of this argument, including my own:

Not surprisingly, catastrophism tends to stress our collective weakness, rather than our collective power.  And that I think is to be avoided, no matter how grim things sometimes appear, because it’s actually inaccurate.

Note the last clause, tagged on to convey truism, but to me it highlights an inadequacy. Don’t stress our collective weakness … because it’s inaccurate; we’re not weak. I rather think the only reason for radicals not to stress the demonstrably profound weakness of the presently mobilized populace is to pretend it is not in fact weak, perhaps fooling people into believing they can accomplish more. Hell, I wouldn’t scorn a rallying strategy that involved a “little white lie”, provided it actually worked.

Current Left strategies (and maybe the whole concept of a “Left”) are failing miserably, while capitalism is very likely entering a new phase of vulnerabilities and limitations.

I don’t think Lilley is suggesting we double down on the status quo Left approaches to change. And that’s good. But continuing to build on strategies that do not include contingencies for collapse is as ill-advised as living without health insurance or not backing up your computer files. (Collapse is not as certain as climate change, so I won’t compare ignoring it to purchasing beach front property.)

But I’m afraid collapse is far more likely than an authentic social revolution emerging while capitalism is, as Emperor Palpatine described his second Death Star, “quite operational”. Since capitalism doesn’t have an exhaust vent leading to a critical vulnerability we can torpedo, we may have to resort to sabotaging its defenses, building strong alternatives, and vigilantly preparing for better opportunities. Besides, the sweetest irony of all would be if, in the end, zombie capitalism lost out not to a lofty idea, but to a superior, competing system already in practice. (No, I’m not actually arguing that irony is a justification for delay. Sheesh!)

I think Sasha Lilley and I broadly agree on so much here, differing mainly in our hopes that the Left can pull off a revolution. We probably also both believe she’s a better writer than I am, so I urge you to read her previous short treatment on this subject, “Apocalypse Now?


Are We Really All One Big Equally Unhappy 99%?


Radical economist Michael Albert has made a tremendous contribution to the so-called occupy movement by injecting nuanced class analysis. The 99% slogan has caught on, and it’s easy to understand why. But it’s not a good idea to accept the notion that everyone who isn’t super rich is in one unified camp, even setting ideology aside. The 99% can’t form an egalitarian society or anything close to it until we address internal structural matters… such as that pesky third class aside from workers and capitalists. I believe it’s downright dangerous, and that maybe my friend Mike understates the problem, if anything.

We Are The 99% – But Are We?



Linkage: Ecuadorian ‘Utopia’, CEO Pay vs. Taxes, Corps vs. Unions, School ‘Reform’, ‘Overpopulation’


Okay, remembering that these “linkage” posts are really just supposed to be for me to get some recommended reads out without doing my usual (admittedly often overwrought) analysis… trying hard to keep it short and resist extensive comment…

1/4 of Big Corp CEOs Get Bigger Cut than Uncle Sam

That’s right: 25 of the top 100 US corporations pay their CEOs more than they pay in income taxes. In these cases, one guy is benefiting from corporate profits more than the entire public. Also noteworthy, the pay collected by top executives in 2010 was 325 times that of the average worker in that company, up from a factor of 263 in 2009!

A ‘New Economic Utopia’ in Ecuador?

I’m going to have to take a better look at what NEF’s Saamah Abdallah is calling a kind of “utopia” in the remote Intag Valley of Ecuador. Very interesting engagement of localism and alternative economics by villagers.

‘Crisis of Advanced Capitalism’

I just found this unorthodox writer Charles Hugh Smith (what’s up with economists named “Smith”?). I really don’t know what to make of him yet, and wish I could give this piece on “Marx, Labor’s Dwindling Share of the Economy and the Crisis of Advanced Capitalism” a thorough critique. But it’s an interested read.

‘Workers of the World, Good Night’

This short piece from Rick Bookstaber (via EconoMonitor) gets off to a slow start, but I enjoyed reading it (and wish I had time to tear it apart, but alas…).

Labor Unions vs. Corporations

I found this mildly anti-union commentary to be informative in terms of how many “libertarian”-leaning economic observers view unions, especially as compared to corporations. It’s kind of amazing that solidarity and cooperation as principles per se seem like foreign concepts even to economists who acknowledge that these are a key aims of unions in a strictly economistic/functional sense. As the author Adam Ozimek puts it:

If, however, you see anti-competitive behavior as a reason that unions exist, then the comparison [to corporations] falls apart.

I guess from my perspective, it’s funny to consider that “anti-competitive behavior” is not the raison d’etre of labor unions. “Anti-competitive” sounds so much more dastardly than “cooperative”.

Update: I can’t help myself (which means moving on to my real work of the day rather than reading/blogging economics). A few more links:

Latest from EPI

The Economic Policy Institute has a couple of new contributions. One is a study on the “lasting damage” of high joblessness on “wages, benefits, income, and wealth”. No big surprise, but some important research. Also some doozies like “Roughly 31% of U.S. workers experienced unemployment or underemployment at some point in 2009″, and “To fill the [net jobs shortfall] by mid-2014 … 400,000 jobs would need to be created each month.”

Also from EPI, this much-needed decimation of a new book by education pseudo-reform champion Stephen Brill (Waiting for Superman). Called Class Warfare, the book is reportedly even more brazen in its ignorance of educational reality than the documentary. The review pulls no punches in exposing the odd mix of liberal/conservative/”libertarian” figures of this new anti-union “reform” movement:

These crusaders now are the establishment, as arrogant as any that preceded them.

‘Overpopulation’ Bogey Man Haunts Times Square

I will take any chance to lash out at the overpopulation myth, but I’d much rather let others do it for me better. Betsy Hartmann does this in Common Dreams (via Climate and Capitalism). Hartmann is jumping on a new video playing in Times Square that apparently tries to terrify tourists about growing human populations. Hartmann makes short work of this idiocy:

Instead of blaming overpopulation, Americans need to get serious about climate policy, conservation, the transition to renewable energy, and mass transport.  And we need to challenge the grotesque and growing inequality of wealth and power in our nation that fuels conspicuous consumption and weakens the government’s commitment to environmental regulation. It’s also high time for environmentalists to stop turning a blind eye toward the role of the military in environmental degradation.